Skip navigation

Mutual Fund News

Select few reap unfair gain

Darting in and out of mutual funds, market professionals have scooped up hundreds of millions of dollars in profits at the expense of ordinary investors, KAREN HOWLETT reports

What they don't tell you about timed trading

Mutual fund firms tell investors to "buy and hold." But under the watchful eye of fund managers, sophisticated market professionals have been given free reing to zip in and out of some of Canada's biggest funds, carefully timing their trades and scooping up hundreds of millions of dollars in quick profits - money that belongs to the funds' long-term investors.

In the U.S. Sliot Spitzer launched a crackdown that resulted in nearly $2-billion in fines. In Canada, critics complain the country's biggest regulator is moving at a snail's pace.

A six-day series begins today with a three-page report.

A select group of hedge fund managers and other market professionals have siphoned off hundreds of millions of dollars of value from Canadian mutual funds over a four-year period by engaging in a trading strategy of darting in and out of the funds to scoop up profits, a Report on Business investigation has found.

This rapid in-and-out trading in the funds totalled more than $220-billion between 2000 and 2003, a pattern highly suggestive of so-called market timing, the investigation uncovered.

Market timing typically takes place in overseas funds where time zone differences often make prices of stocks in a fund out of date because of market events elsewhere. Not all active trading can be attributed to market timers. But the magnitude of the dollars involved suggests that market pros are behind it.

The trading has been hugely profitable for the select few, who made an estimated $550-million to $650-million in profits between 2000 and 2003. The figures -- based on a U.S. academic study that estimates market timers pocket 60 to 70 basis points in profits for every round trip -- assumes all activity in a fund in excess of benchmark levels was a result of questionable trading.

Their unwitting victims? Ordinary investors. Profits pocketed by market timers have simply vanished from dozens of mutual funds, stripping their shareholders of an enormous store of wealth.

While the average fund shareholder was left in the dark, market professionals were darting in and out of funds managed by many of the largest companies, including Investors Group Inc., CI Fund Management Inc. and AGF Management Ltd. "I don't make any bones about it," said William Holland, chief executive officer of CI. "There were people trading in and out of funds, just like they were everywhere."

Market timing is the very antithesis of the buy-and-hold strategy preached by the industry, which has flourished by promoting mutual funds as stable investment havens. Industry assets have grown from $390-billion at the end of 1999 to $474-billion, equivalent to 40 per cent of the retirement savings of Canadians. Over that same period, the number of shareholder accounts has increased from 40.9 million to 51.2 million.

But the trading activities uncovered by Report on Business reveal that it isn't a level playing field for mutual fund investors. Rather, there are two classes of investors: rank-and-file Canadians building their retirement nest eggs and a select few market professionals ramping up a fund's costs and diluting its returns by rushing in and out.

Although market timing isn't illegal, it violates procedures many fund companies have in place to shield their shareholders from added costs and volatility.

The practice is rooted in a willingness of at least some fund managers to put their own financial interests ahead of their long-term shareholders. Most fund managers are compensated based on assets under management; a big influx of cash gives a manager more assets to manage.

The rush to gather assets and earn management fees can be at odds with a manager's fiduciary duty to act in the best interests of all shareholders. A mutual fund's returns are based not on a fund's size but on how well its investments perform.

The mutual fund industry is built on a foundation of not just providing millions of Canadians with investments that earn solid returns, but also integrity and trust. The trading uncovered by Report on Business raises questions about who is watching over fund managers to ensure they are not misplacing that trust.

The findings suggest that market timing might have been prevalent in Canada as well as in the United States, where the confidence of investors has been badly shaken by revelations of widespread wrongdoing. The probe into market timing and other improper trading practices is the biggest scandal to hit the U.S. fund industry in more than 60 years.

The probe has had an impact on this side of the border. Figures calculated by Report on Business show that the dollars transferred in and out of funds dropped off sharply during the last four months of 2003 in the same funds that had shown patterns of active trading earlier in the year.

The bigger impact may be yet to come. In the United States, regulators have taken enforcement action against 12 of the 25 biggest mutual fund companies. Nearly $2-billion (U.S.) in fines have been levied and many top executives have lost their jobs and are under investigation. Investors have severely punished those companies caught up in the multiple probes by pulling tens of billions of dollars out of their funds.

At a time when regulators in the United States have launched a broad crackdown on market timing and other trading abuses, the Ontario Securities Commission has come under criticism from investor advocates for not proactively rooting out any problems here.

The commission sent out questionnaires to every fund company in the province last October, seeking information about their policies and procedures designed to limit market timing. It is now in the process of conducting on-site reviews of about 15 companies.

Stan Buell, head of the 500-member Small Investor Protection Association, attributes the OSC's tepid response to the fact that it has delegated much of the responsibility for protecting investors to industry-run, self-regulatory groups.

"We need someone to look at [the industry] from an investor protection point of view," he said. "If we had that, I think there would be more focus on these mutual fund problems."

Market timers take advantage of the fact that mutual funds do not price the securities in their investment portfolio on a continuous basis; they only do it once a day. When the markets close at 4 p.m., mutual funds calculate their price (or net asset value as it's known in the business) by using the most recent trading prices for stocks in their investment portfolio.

The following example illustrates how mutual funds that invest in overseas securities allow traders a simple but profitable time-zone arbitrage. Let's take an Asian fund that manages $100-million in assets and owns a basket of companies listed on Japanese markets.

On a Tuesday afternoon, U.S. stocks rally heavily in New York. A hedge fund manager, who spends his days in front of a bank of computer terminals watching the markets like a hawk, figures there's a high likelihood stocks in Japan will follow the U.S. lead when overseas markets reopen the following day.

Before the markets close in New York on Tuesday, the manager buys $50-million worth of units in the mutual fund at $10 each. That money does not affect the market value of the fund because it is sitting in cash -- it has to be invested to earn a return.

Because markets in Tokyo closed at 2 a.m. Eastern time, 14 hours before New York, stock prices of the fund's foreign holdings do not yet reflect the market rally.

The hedge fund manager assumes that market events elsewhere have made prices of stocks in the fund out of date and that shares in the fund are worth more than what he paid for them.

As it turns out, he has bet right. Markets in Tokyo climb 10 per cent the following day. As a result, units in the fund have also climbed to $11 from $10, making the fund's assets worth $110-million. That same day, he sells his units at the new, higher value of $11, thus pocketing a profit of $3.3-million, representing one-third of the gain posted by the fund.

In essence, he has deprived the fund's long-term investors of the full value of the increase in their securities. This is unfair to these investors because it was their money that actually financed the investments that produced the profits. Yet the market timer got to share in the profits even though his investment didn't generate any returns for the fund.

Eric Zitzewitz, an assistant professor of economics at Stanford University's business school, whose research has been cited in court documents, estimates that the dilution created by market timers costs average shareholders in international mutual funds 1 to 2 per cent of their assets each year.

Rapid trading by one very large customer can also wreak havoc on the ability of the fund managers to make money for everyone else. Big sums rushing in and out rob them of flexibility in buying and selling stocks because they have to keep extra cash at the ready to pay the exiting timer.

Many mutual fund companies openly acknowledge in their legal disclosure documents the toll rapid trading takes on their long-term investors. AIM Funds Management Inc., for example, has this to say in the prospectus for one of its funds: "Trading or switching often in order to time the market is generally not a good idea. Frequent trading can also hurt a fund's performance, affecting all the investors in a fund."

However, the industry has a mixed track record for keeping the market timers at bay.

Fidelity Investments Canada Ltd., TD Asset Management Inc. and Phillips Hager & North Investment Management Ltd. have also made the market timers unwelcome in their funds.

Since the early 1990s, Fidelity's Boston-based parent has used fair value pricing for its global operations, including Canada. Fair valuing takes the profits out of market timing by adjusting the prices for stocks in a portfolio when events after the markets close cause big discrepancies between current values and expected new values.

"This gain doesn't come out of thin air. It comes out of the pockets of other investors," said Peter Bowen, a vice-president and chief compliance officer at Fidelity Investments Canada.

Since 1996, TD Asset, Canada's sixth-largest fund manager, has slapped an automatic 2-per-cent penalty fee on anyone who redeems their money within 90 days of investing it.

At Vancouver-based PH&N, anyone who makes a round-trip trade in five days -- by moving cash from a money market fund to an equity fund and back again -- can be hit with a 2-per-cent penalty.

"In the event they want to continue it, we're not the firm they want to deal with," said Richard Self, a PH&N vice-president. As a result, he said, the firm's experience with market timers is virtually non-existent.

Report on Business calculated churn rates -- levels of sales, redemptions and transfers as a percentage of average assets -- for hundreds of international equity funds for each of the four years. Asian, European and other overseas funds are most vulnerable to market timers, who take advantage of time-zone differences.

The funds singled out had three characteristics: annual churn rates exceeding 100 per cent; the bulk of the churn rate from money transferred to and from another fund within the same company; and monthly transfers in and out that were roughly similar.

Last year alone, 15 companies had funds that fit the pattern. As a group, the funds had an aggregate churn rate of 221 per cent, five times the level for international equity funds with no pattern of in-and-out trading. While this figure is not conclusive proof of market timing, it represents a level almost impossible to achieve without improper trading, according to U.S. academics who have studied market timing.

A churn rate of 100 per cent means that cash equal to the value of a fund's average assets flowed in and out during the course of the year. In many instances, churn rates exceeded 1,000 per cent.

In 2003, the in-and-out trading totalled $25.5-billion -- the activity came to a standstill last September, after New York State Attorney-General Eliot Spitzer launched an investigation into the practice. The trading peaked at $79-billion in 2002. To put that in context, all of the international equity funds run by Canadian companies collectively manage $94.2-billion in assets.

The practice involved funds managed by eight of the 10 largest Canadian companies in one or more years. These companies collectively manage $287-billion in mutual fund assets, accounting for 60 per cent of the domestic industry.

Investors Group, the second-biggest fund company in Canada, has 13 funds with telltale signs of market timing. CI, the country's fifth-largest company, has 32 funds, well in excess of any other company.

The active trading was done in funds of all sizes, ranging from those that manage less than $10-million to the Templeton Growth Fund, the second-largest fund in Canada with $6.8-billion in assets under management.

A disproportionate number of the funds invest in overseas securities, with European and Asian funds accounting for 44 per cent of the total. Yet these funds represent only 19 per cent of all international funds included in statistics compiled by the Investment Funds Institute of Canada.

Report on Business used data supplied by fund companies to IFIC to calculate churn rates.

Some companies that had excessive trading in their international funds took steps to end it well before Mr. Spitzer turned his sights on the U.S. mutual fund industry.

Dynamic Mutual Funds Ltd. had a handful of international funds with active traders in 2001. But they appear to have gone elsewhere in 2002 and 2003, after the firm took steps to discourage them.

AIM Funds had active traders in several of its funds in 2001 but there were few if any signs of their presence in later years. Spokesman Dwayne Dreger said the last time fund managers suspected the activity was in early 2003. "There were one or two attempts, but nothing since then," he said.

Jonathan Hartman vice-president of business development at RBC Asset Management Inc., the largest fund company in Canada, said the firm monitors its funds for market timers. When they're caught, they get booted out, he said. "We have become more aggressive in this regard in the last two years." RBC had a couple of international funds with high churn rates in 2002 and earlier.

Many other fund companies in Canada did not begin to come to terms with the impact market timing was having on average investors until more recently.

"Market timing was a practice that kind of crept up on people," said Patricia Phillips, a spokeswoman at AGF Funds. "Nobody said anything about it. Nobody did anything about it . . . and then suddenly, it became a big, deadly sin."

Because there were no rules against market timing, she said, many fund managers tolerated the activity, mainly out of a desire to accommodate clients. Just how deleterious the timers were to AGF's funds became glaringly apparent last summer.

Last July, AGF blamed active, large-volume traders for nearly half of its net redemptions of $229-million the previous month and announced that it would impose a 2-per-cent fee on clients who redeem or switch funds within 90 days of buying them.

In fact, the industry itself may have inadvertently encouraged much of the trading through the creation of a class of funds that makes it easy for investors to switch in and out of funds owned by the same company and earn profits without paying capital gains taxes.

Many industry executives said sector funds and clone funds were responsible for some of the active trading in their funds. Mr. Holland, the head of CI, said the level of active trading in CI's funds picked up after the company introduced sector funds in 1996, Mr. Holland said.

"We had active traders in there for sure," he said. "The bigger the funds became, the more people transferred in and out of them."

While Mr. Holland and Ms. Phillips openly acknowledged that market timing was alive and well in Canada, other executives came up with other reasons to explain the activity in their funds. They said it had more to do with investors shifting their assets from one sector to another or from foreign to domestic funds.

However, if the activity resulted from allocation strategies, lots of investors in lots of funds would have been doing the same thing. And they would have been moving their money in one direction -- either into a fund or out of it.

That was simply not the case. The trading patterns didn't happen in the international equity funds managed by Fidelity and TD Asset Management. Nor did they happen in Latin American and other international funds in the same time zones as North American markets.

The Report on Business findings raise a compelling question for the Canadian mutual fund industry: Why were so many fund managers willing to risk their reputations by allowing market timing in their funds? Fund managers typically monitor cash coming in and going out, on a daily basis, so a big influx would not have gone unnoticed.

One possible explanation is that during the dying days of the bull market in early 2001, fund companies were under enormous pressure to gather assets. Along with falling stock markets, they watched the assets they manage decline as many investors headed for the exits.

For many industry executives, the scandal in the United States has been a wake-up call. CI's Mr. Holland said nobody believed the timers could make money at what they were doing because nobody was paying attention to their activities.

"We never thought about it," he said. "It wasn't topical."

Looking behind the churn rates

Transfers in and out account for the lion's share of activity in those funds with churn rates exceeding 100 per cent, while sales and redemptions account for a much smaller portion of the cash flows. This is a strong indication of market timing. By contrast, action in the benchmark funds of Fidelity Investments Canada and TD Asset Management is more evenly spread. Fidelity and TD were chosen for the benchmark because for several years each company has had procedures in place to dissuade market timers.

The yearly breakdown for funds with churn rates exceeding 100 per cent.

...............Sales..Redemption..Transfers in..Transfers out..Churn

2000.........30.8%.....13.9%.....116.4%.......112.6%........273.0%

Benchmark..25.0.......11.7.........13.1..........12.7............62.5

2001.........17.5........18.2.......102.7..........107.4..........245.5

Benchmark..14.9.......14.3..........6.1.............8.7...........44.2

2002..........7.9.........14.0........162.5.........166.3..........352.0

Benchmark..13.1........15.5..........4.0............8.3............40.9

2003.........12.1........19.4..........93.1..........96.8..........221.2

Benchmark..11.0.......16.7...........8.4............8.5............44.5

In-and-out trading

The pace of in-and-out trading rose steadily through to 2002, when 73 funds had churn rates exceeding 100 per cent. A churn rate of 100 per cent means that cash equal to a fund's average assets changed hands during the course of a year.

2000 Number of funds: 43

Number of fund companies with in-and-out trading in their funds: 13

2001 Number of funds: 79

Number of fund companies with in-and-out trading in their funds: 16

2002 Number of funds: 73

Number of fund companies with in-and-out trading in their funds: 16

2003: Number of funds: 53

Number of fund companies with in-and-out trading in their funds: 15

High stakes

The dollar value of rapid in-and-out trading peaked in 2002, falling off after September, 2003, when U.S. authorities launched a crackdown on market timing and other questionable practices.

2000: 44.2

2001: 62.7

2002: 89.8

2003: 25.5

Series schedule

Today

- Rapid trading in mutual funds bears marks of market timing

- Mechanics of market timing, who does it, who doesn't ad why.

Tomorrow

- Proposed rules for fund governance favour industry, critics say.

Wednesday

- Compensation issues are paramount for fund managers, which make sure they get paid first

Thursday

- Fees and fund performance don't always go hand-in-hand

Friday

- Segregated fund fees on the rise

Saturday

- Dos and don'ts for investors

Series writers

Rob Carrick

Report on Business personal finance columnist, has closely followed the mutual fund industry for years.

Elizabeth Church

Covers the real estate industry and also writes on governance matters as part of the annual Board Games ranking of corporate boards.

Keith Damsell

Has covered media, mining, forestry and most recently, technology. He began following the mutual fund sector in May.

Derek DeCloet

Writes the Vox column in the Money & Markets section and has covered financial services and investing for five years.

Karen Howlett

Has covered the financial services industry, including banks and mutual funds, as well as securities regulation, since the early 1990s.

Janet McFarland

A report-columnist, writes on corporate governance, executive compensation, securities industry regulation and shareholder rights.

Andrew Willis

The Globe's Streetwise columnist, has reported on financial markets at various news organizations for more than 15 years.

The case for market timing

Rapid in-and-out timing in Canadian mutual funds, discovered in a Report on Business investigation, is a pattern highly suggestive of market timing, which is hugely profitable for a few market professionals who siphoned off an estimated $550-million to $65-million in value from mutual funds between 2000 and 2003. Ordinary, long-term investors lost out as market timers pocketed profits. (A churn rate of 100% means the equivalent of every unit in the fund had changed hands during the course of a year.)

.....................................Assets.....--------Churn rate (%)---------

Fund company...................($000's)....2000....2001....2002....2003

AGF Funds

Aggressive Japan Class...........3,400........-......291......178........-

Aggressive Global Stock.......102,700.......-.......258......286........-

Asian Growth Class..............80,900......383....1,165.....599......364

European Equity Class..........542,200.......-.......235......189......142

Global Technology Class........15,700........-.......341......164......128

International Stock Class.......813,400.......-.......182......536.......177

Japan Class.......................72,700......277......692......413......282

RSP Int'l Equity Allocation....242,900.........-......150......370.........-

RSP Japan........................46,300......261........-.......157.......182

World Equity......................77,200........-.......336......894.........-

Global Strategy World..........311,400........-.......255......649.........-

China Focus Series...............17,800........-.......404......100.........-

AIC

Global Advantage...............126,300......908....1,627....1,046.......431

Global Diversified................38,500......898.....1,619......900......270

RSP Global Advantage..........64,500........-..........-..........-.......143

RSP World Advantage..........62,900........-..........-........123.........-

World Advantage...............148,000......794.....1,171......444.........-

World Equity....................293,000......675........922......713......299

AIM Funds Management

European Growth Class.........8,000........-..........369......169........99

European Growth Fund.........83,200.......-..........140........-..........-

Trimark Europlus C$...........144,600.......-..........136........-..........-

Indo-Pacific Class...............13,000......402.......539.......-...........-

Oindo-Pacific Fund.............66,000.........-.........282........-..........-

Int'l Growth Class..............9,100...........-.........201........-..........-

RSP Indo-Pacific.................7,800.........-.........244.......-...........-

CIBC Securities

Talvest Asian.....................14,700......325........101.........-..........-

Talvest China Plus...............22,100......443.......349.........-..........-

Talvest China Plus RSP.........3,900..........-........305.........-..........-

Talvest Global Asset Alloc....47,200........326........580.........-..........-Talvest Global Equity...........24,900..........-......2,037.........-.......329

Tal. Global Multi-Man. RSP..166,400..........-........102.........-..........-

Talvest Global RRSP...........95,000........314.......654.........-..........-

Talvest Global S & T RSP.....13,300...........-........189.........-.......198

Talvest Global Small Cap.......41,800..........-........431.........-.......138

CI Mutual Funds

BPI Global Equity...............597,000......213.......311.......896......563

BPI Int'l Equity..................125,400........-........247.......801.......432

BPI Int'l Equity RSP..............6,000.........-..........-........216.......281

BPI Int'l Equity Sector............6,400.........-.........-........244.......446

Asian Dynasty....................21,300.........-..........-...........-.......115

European Fund...................35,000.........-........127.......582.......160

Emerging Markets...............166,900........-..........-........302........89

European Growth.................87,100.........-.........101......139.......127

European Growth RSP............8,200.........-..........-...........-........175

European Sector Shares........12,000..........-.........182......202........98

Global Boomeronics............504,600.........-............-.......473.........-

Global Equity RSP.............617,200........120........153.........-..........-

Global Fin. Service.............113,400..........-.........151......312......151

Global Fund...................1,235,500........202........283.......967......654

Global Small Co................107,200........156........245.......683.......197

Global Value....................120,600..........-.........117.......502......257

Int'l Balanced...................466,400.......292..........-......1,300......764

Int'l Balanced Sector...........13,500...........-..........-.........121........-

Int'l Fund.........................42,900..........-.........137.......436......653

Int'l Value........................33,900.........-...........-.........294......136

Int'l RSP..........................11,300..........-.........227.......894........-

Japanese RSP.....................4,000.........-...........-.........314......474

Japanese Sector Shares.........12,700.......523........341.......560.......590

Pacific............................115,800.......165........342....1,138........208

Pacific RSP .......................3,700..........-.........431......306.......469

Pacific Sector Shares............22,500.......444........554.......528......345

Sector Emer. Mkts Shares......23,800.........-...........-........147.........-

Sector Global Shares............261,600......106..........-........157.........-

Sec. Glob. Tech. Shares........103.900.........-.........180........-...........-

Sec. Glob. Tele. Shares.........176,900.........-.........167........-...........-

Clarington Funds

Global Communications..........18,900.......143.........166......232.........-

Global Equity......................131,200......286.........400......457.......292

Global Small Cap.................20,800.......317..........169.........-.........-

Int'l Equity........................13,900.......285..........641......281.......260

Dynamic

European Value.................117,400..........-..........219.........-..........-

Far East Value...................17,800..........-..........542.........-...........-

International Value..............134,000.........-..........201.........-...........-

RSP Far East Value...............3,000.........-..........427.........-...........-

Strat. Nova Com. World Bal...149,000......538.........187.........-...........-

Strat. Nova Europe Fund........27,800........305.........577......835..........-

Strat. Nova Europe RSP..........5,300.......487...........-...........-..........-

Strat. Nova World Equity........57,300.......612...........-...........-..........-

Strat. Nova Wld. Large Cap....71,400.........-...........465......698.........-

Elliott & Page

Elliott & Page Asian Growth.....5,500.........-...........168.......474.......187

Guardian Group of Funds

GGOF Global Growth Fund.....15,600.........-...........416.........-.........186

HSBC

AsiaPacific........................41,000.......238.........389.......185.........-

European.........................110,522.........-..........176.........-...........-

Investors Group

IG AGF Asian Growth Fund....30,000.........-..........202........357.......104

IG AGF Int'l Equity..............192,000........-..........150........248.........-

Scudder European Growth......138,000......140..........-...........-...........-

Templeton Int'l Equity...........122,800........-..........125.........139.........-

Templeton World Allocation.....66,000........-............-..........177.........-

Investors European Grth......1,204,000.......177........200..........-...........-

Inves. European Mid Cap.......287,700.........-...........-..........167.........-

Investors Global..................662,200.........-.........166........310..........-

Investors Japanese Growth......78,800.........-.........358........468..........-

Inves. Pacific Int'l CI S A........2,500..........-...........-...........-.........290

Investors Pacific Int'l............161,300........-.........254.........336.........94

Inves. Pan Asian Growth.........11,300........-............-..........-.........160

Ionves. World Growth Port......236,500.......-............-.........179.........-

MD Management

Int'l Growth RSP...................10,600.......-............-.........195.......366

Mackenzie Financial

Ivy Global Balanced...............141,900.......-.........180..........-...........-

Univ. Euro. Oppor. Cap CI.......27,500........-............-.........117.........-

Un. Sei. Man. F East Cap CI.....48,900........-.........183..........-.........205

Universal European Oppor.......545,400.......-.........180..........-...........-

Universal Far East.................25,400......369........997..........-...........-

R Funds (BLC-Rothschild)

R Asian...............................6,600.......-............-...........-.........462

R European.........................11,900.......-............-............-.........318

RBC Funds

Asian Equity........................80,200......246.......325...........522......115

Int'l Equity..........................51,700........-............-...........144........-

Scotia Securities

Scotia Pacific Rim Growth........23,600.......222..........-...........165......228

Franklin Templeton

Temp. Global Growth............6,235,000.......-............-...........142........-

Franklin Japan Tax Class............4,500........-............-..........202.......529

Temp. Emerging Mkt.............337,700........-............-..........156........-

Temp. Global Smaller.............566,300........-............-..........164........-

Templeton Int'l Stock...........2,912,000.........-.........120..........285........-

Temp. Int'l Stock Class............43,100........-............-...........150.......147

CIBC acquired control of Talvest in October, 2001.

Dynamic's parent company acquired StrategicNova in July, 2002.

C.I. acquired Spectrum investment in 2002.

Assets are as of Dec. 31, 2003, with the exception of those funds that were no longer in existence that year.

Some smaller funds that had churn rates exceeding 100 per cent in only one year are excluded from the list of funds with a pattern of trading that indicated signs of market timing.

© 2007 The Globe and Mail. All rights reserved.

Search Fund News


Advanced Search

GlobeinvestorGOLD.com

Only GlobeinvestorGOLD combines the strength of powerful investing tools with the insight of The Globe and Mail.

Discover a wealth of investment information and and exclusive features.

Free E-Mail Newsletters

  • Morning news headlines
  • Morning business headlines
  • Financial highlights
  • Tech alert
  • Leisure

Sign-up for our free newsletters



Back to top